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Abstract 
 
How important is spatial identity in shifting preferences for redistribution? This 
paper takes advantage of within-country variability in the adoption of a single 
currency as an instrument to examine the impact of the rescaling of spatial identity in 
Europe. We draw upon data from the last three decades of waves of the European 
Values Survey and we examine the impact of joining the single currency on 
preferences for redistribution. Our instrumentation strategy relies on using the 
exogenous effect of joining a common currency, alongside a battery of robustness 
checks and alternative instruments. Our findings suggest that joining the euro has a 
boosting effect on European identity; an opposite and comparable effect is found for 
national pride. We find that European identity increases preferences for 
redistribution, and that national pride exerts an equivalent reduction in preferences 
for redistribution. 
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European Identity and Redistributive 
Preferences  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We still know relatively little about what shapes preferences for redistribution. 
The standard political economy theory of redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 
1981, Romer 1975), linking the expansion of gross income inequality to increased 
demands for redistribution, has not been consistently validated in practice 
(Georgiadis and Manning 2012, Gouveia and Masia 1998). Other explanations 
focus on the presence of biased perceptions of redistribution,1 the expectations of 
offspring social mobility (Banabou and Ok 2001), the influence of ethnic 
fractionalisation (Alesina et al. 2001) or the role of genetics.2 
 
Here we focus on the influence of social identity on preferences for 
redistribution, that is, the presence of common reference points (prescriptions) 
acting as social norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) which influence behaviour 
within the social group; the identity mechanism then confers some sense of social                                                         1 It is common to find some disconnect between how preferences are perceived and true distribution of wealth and income. Norton and Ariely (2011) find that perceptions of wealth distribution do not correspond to real wealth distribution in the US. Reducing the information bias that individuals have with regards to their position in the income distribution influences redistributive preferences (Cruces et al. 2013). 2 Zakharov and Ponarin (2013) examined data from redistribution in Russian regions and find that individuals with similar genetic makeup (L allele) systematically prefer more redistribution.  
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solidarity on the members of the group. If identity plays this role and solidarity 
is determined within the context of the nation, a move from that setting to 
another will affect people’s preferences for redistribution. However, it may be 
that the development of a European identity affects the extent of solidarity and 
individual experiences within a wider community. The move from the default of 
national solidarity expression may be pro-redistributive. 
 
Identity might contribute to the development of cognitive biases insofar as a 
person’s reference group is not the whole population but that of his group, or his 
country. People in relatively rich countries may perceive themselves as being 
poorer than they really are, not so much because of an information bias, but 
because their reference point is based on the social group they identify with, and 
not necessarily the whole population. So an important question for empirical 
purposes is that of identifying whether an exogenous change in reference point, 
such as the relevant spatial dimension of identity (Europe v national), exerts an 
influence on distributional preferences. Ignoring identity and relying on an 
individualistic model of self-interested demand for redistribution will 
underestimate the benefits of redistribution itself.3 Processes of regional 
integration offer a unique natural experiment to examine such a question in the 
field. 
 
Social identities shape individuals’ preferences by defining a “sense of 
belonging” to a club good that appears in people’s utility functions (Akerlof 
1997). Accordingly, an individual suffers disutility from deviating from his or her 
category norms, which induces behaviour that conforms to those norms (Akerlof                                                         3  Carlsson et al. (2014) find that pro-social preferences are stable over time in an experimental setting. 
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and Kranton 2000). The extent to which identity influences preferences has wide-
ranging implications for welfare economics4 feeling part of a group triggers more 
positive social evaluation towards the group (Cremer and Vugt 1999, Gaertner et 
al. 1989). The substitution of a national currency by a common currency (the 
euro) may have triggered some salience to the European project resulting in a 
greater weight of the European component of people’s identity; at the same time 
identity may remain highly valued as a position good, especially for European 
countries that did not enjoy the club status with their own national attachments. 
Identification with a polity largely depends on the status of the groups compared 
to the alternative possible status (Roccas 2003). 
 
Our focus in this paper is on individuals’ redistributive preferences, and we 
claim that the development of a European identity resulting from institutional 
reforms such as the introduction of a common currency provides quasi-
experimental evidence to examine it. Europe is the ideal setting to study changes 
in identity, given that the progressive integration process exerts effects on 
welfare-state institutions, which in turn can influence the existing welfare 
institutions by affecting people’s redistributive preferences. The unique 
experience of the setting up of a single currency exerted a non-neutral effect on 
European attachment as measured by confidence in the EU, and reduced 
national pride. This result is consistent with other findings that indicate that 
European identity explains satisfaction with democracy (Hobolt 2012). Similarly, 
Risse (2010) finds that people who identify themselves as European are more 
likely to identify with the values of tolerance and democracy. 
                                                         4 Social identity has been suggested to reduce altruism and redistribution (Luttmer 2001, Shayo 2009, Costa-i-Font and Cowell 2015). 
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The intuition behind the paper is that, when identity is defined by a “broader 
other,” people are more likely to express a preference for true redistribution 
(redistribution in small communities might be partially explained by exchange 
motivations instead). Becoming part of the Eurozone club in a setting where 
redistribution is primarily undertaken by national welfare states should not 
change the individual’s expectation of benefiting from redistribution, and should 
primarily affect the rescaling of people’s spatial identity. However, there is a 
potential reverse causality that should be taken into account: a revival of anti-
European nationalism (which we proxy here by national pride) is underpinned 
by anti-immigration attitudes; also there might be a problem with omitted-
variable bias if some confounding variables correlated with identity. In this 
paper we propose an instrumental-variable strategy that takes advantage of the 
adoption of a common currency (a largely exogenous decision to individuals 
themselves). We focus on countries that adopted the common currency only after 
its inception so that we can observe a period before and after being part of the 
common currency. We use other instruments to measure the robustness of our 
results. Finally, we use different subsamples to ascertain whether the results hold 
beyond the specific country sample. 
 
Our paper brings together different strands of the literature. We incorporate 
some findings from the European politics literature suggesting that some aspects 
of national identity are substituted for, with the expansion of European identity. 
This not only changes people’s affiliations but also preferences towards equality. 
In a more competitive setting, such as that of a wider European Union, wide 
inequalities are likely to emerge and so the role of redistributive mechanisms 
becomes more important. We contribute to the literature on preference for 
redistribution and the limitations of the Meltzer and Richard approach. Third, 
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the paper contributes to the role of identity in influencing economic behaviour 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005). If changes in institutions affect people’s 
preferences by changing their identification and collective affiliations then policy 
needs to be focused more strongly on such indirect effects. Finally, this paper 
extends the findings of Luttmer (2001), suggesting that preferences for 
redistribution change with the share of the poor in a region, as Eurozone 
enlargement to central and Eastern Europe might have exerted an impact on 
preferences for redistribution. However, we argue that the mechanism for such 
an effect is channelled through identity. 
 
Section 2 provides the background to the analysis of this paper. Section 3 
describes the data and methods, section 4 presents results and the paper 
concludes with section 5. 
 
 
2. Background  
 
There are two important branches of the economics literature that connect to the 
approach that we use in this paper: the literature on redistributive preferences 
and the literature on the economics of identity. 
 
2.1. Preferences for redistribution 
                                                                                                              
Economic approaches to redistribution such as Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
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typically assume that people’s position in society determines their preferences5 
and often disregard how people’s social groupings influence preferences. But 
groupings are important: for example, ethnically diverse societies exhibit less 
class conflict or, if they do, it is more rare as ethnicity or identity add additional 
dimension to the political spectrum away from purely economic or redistributive 
questions (Lee and Roemer 2006). 
 
In the last twenty years we have seen an increasing interest in examining how 
multiculturalism and diversity influence preferences for redistribution. Alesina 
et al. (2001) find that ethnic fractionalisation exerts an influence on redistributive 
preferences in the context of the United States where the default is not a 
consolidated welfare state as in Europe. Luttmer (2001) finds a negative 
relationship between diversity and preferences for redistribution: people’s 
preferences for redistribution are interdependent in the sense that preference is 
influenced by the characteristics of other individuals around them. People 
appear to be more likely to redistribute to the groups they identify with, be that 
identification based on ethnicity, religious group, social class, region or 
something else. 
 
Preferences for redistribution have been found to be related to voting behaviour 
and political ideology,6 to people’s own self-interest, 7 to their evaluation of 
                                                        5 By “preferences for redistribution” we mean the generalized support for the transfer of resources to ex-ante undetermined individuals by a set of mechanisms that include taxation, welfare policies and other. 6 Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) find evidence that experiencing a recession during early adulthood affects preferences for redistribution.  7 Durante et al. (2014) conducted a laboratory study to test for the role of redistribution, risk aversion and social preferences as drivers of preferences for redistribution, finding evidence of all of them but with a stronger effect for self-interest. 
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inequalities,8 and to their perceptions of the “leaky bucket”, the efficiency of the 
transfer mechanism (Krawczyk 2010). 
 
Furthermore, redistributive preferences may reflect cultural differences (Luttmer 
and Singhal 2011) and political differences.9 But these differences are not 
exogenous or immutable and may be associated with the phenomenon of 
identity. 
 
 
2.2. Identity  
 
“Identity” refers to mechanisms through which individuals become attached to 
each other by creating a sense of belonging (Tajfel 1978). Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000) consider identity as an externality on people’s actions triggered by the 
presence of common social norms: these are common reference points that can 
shift over time. Collective identities are the expressions of different cultures 
which can be an important source of preference endogeneity (Bowles 1998) and a 
recent survey suggests that they can explain individuals’ solidarity attitudes 
(Costa-i-Font and Cowell 2015). People may alter their behaviour to conform to 
other people’s expectations and social norms (Asch 1951) beyond their narrow 
personal self-interest.10                                                         8 Fong and Luttmer (2011) find that the source of inequality matters. 9 For example, countries under socialism exhibited higher redistributive preferences (Corneo and Gruner 2002). 10 Klor and Shayo (2010) find experimental evidence that when individual sacrifice was not too high, they accommodate their preferences to those of the group. Charness (2007)0 and Chen and Li (2009) show that individuals are altruistic towards the people that belong to the group they identify themselves with. Lindqvist and Ostling (2013) find that in low tax countries some share of the poor identify with their ethnicity and favour low taxes; ethnically homogenous societies exhibit more redistribution. 
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Social identity can have inward effects on the person, and an outward effect on 
the group (Mayer and Palmowski 2004). Clearly a person may be associated with 
multiple groups and, as a result, reveal multiple identities – for example regional 
and European identities. Some identities attributed to a person may conflict with 
each other and even become “oppositional” (Battu and Zenou 2010), but others 
may not. 
 
Identities have been seen as a multidimensional social categorization that can be 
primed by certain circumstances or events. Easton (1975) distinguishes 
instrumental and affective support for political institutions. If an institution is 
perceived as being instrumentally beneficial, the attachment to that institution 
would be expected to increase. Inglehart and Raabier (1978) have put forward the 
theory of cognitive mobilization whereby education exerts an effect on 
individuals’ cosmopolitan identity. 
 
Consider the connection with redistributive preferences discussed in section 2.1. 
National or social identity can act as a “social tie,” which in turn operates in 
enhancing support for the welfare state (Costa-i-Font and Cowell 2015).11 
Redistribution is one of the central features of welfare states: maintenance of 
redistributive institutions largely depends on individual support for taxing 
higher incomes more heavily and targeting expenditures to social need. Since 
such activities are typically associated with nations, the question arises whether 
support for redistributive institutions and programs varies with the rescaling of 
individuals’ identities to both supranational and subnational bodies.                                                         11 However, the underpinning mechanisms for the tying effect are still not well known. For instance, some research in political science argues that the strengthening support of Canadian national identity lies in the effect the welfare state has had in building national identity, and not the other way round (Johnston et al. 2010).  
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Clearly this is of particular interest with reference to a supranational organisation 
such as the European Union. 
 
2.3. European identity  
 
In principle European identity could play a role similar to that of American 
identity, uniting people by transcending borders, and especially racial divisions 
(Transue 2007). A superordinate identity eliminates the effects of parochialism, 
country nationalism and group identity. The “European project” certainly raises 
interesting questions in connection with the mechanisms of redistribution and 
perceptions of identity. With European integration, the efficient level of 
redistribution scales up to the European rather than the country level (Cassela 
and Fray 1992) and is likely to change the strength of people’s attachments to 
state sovereignty as the institutions in member countries become locked into this 
emerging structure (Eichengreen 2008). 
 
The rise of a European common identity acts on people’s attitudes as a pro-
redistributive force that confronts the existence of own-nationality bias (Lowes et 
al. 2015). This is, perhaps, to be expected as spatial identities are potentially 
rescaled from solely national to the supranational, European, level. However, 
within this structure there is a variety of identities – national, regional, European 
– and we know little about the relations between these identities, whether they 
are complementary, substitute or independent. So it is not clear a priori whether 
the priming of an identity (as mentioned in section 2.2) would exert an external 
effect on others. 
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However, among the variety of priming events that might be considered 
relevant, one of the most important would be the setting up of a common 
currency. The introduction of a single currency encompasses the reduction of one 
of the most important old symbols of national identity; so one should expect it to 
exert an influence on people’s identification: the euro exemplifies the strategy of 
burning one’s boats. For many countries joining the euro club has meant a way to 
improving their status worldwide, and hence it implied positive social 
externality. Support for the euro has remained stable, even through the recent 
crisis;12 but whether such (largely exogenous) externality leads to stronger 
preference for redistribution is an empirical question. 
 
2.4. Our approach   
 
In this paper we take advantage of an institutional reform, the adoption of the 
single currency, which we argue has had a symbolic effect on priming European 
identity. The introduction of the euro and its effects when the national currencies 
were effectively replaced would be expected to have had an effect on attitudes 
and preferences. We can test whether that effect was stronger for countries that 
joined the euro initially than for the rest. 
 
                                                        12 This is in contrast to trust in European institutions generally, which has fallen. Guiso et al. (2014) find that the main determinants of positive sentiment towards the EU is the quality of government, and develop an argument on institutional arbitrage: the change in support to EU integration is determined by a change in support for the single market and the change in support for a single currency. Positive sentiments towards the EU are primarily affected negatively by unemployment and the enlargement post 2004 in Southern European countries. Education, age, gender, and the socio-economic status of individuals have consistently been found to be salient contributors to 
individuals’ support for the EU. Age, income, occupation, and political values are not merely controls 
in this analysis but rather contribute to individuals’ cognitive development and thus understanding of the EU project (Inglehart 1991). 
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But capturing identity empirically is not a simple task. Most studies rely on 
survey questions which identify some component of a “latent European 
identity.” Some evidence finds that the stronger is the feeling of national identity, 
the weaker is support for the European Union (Carey 2002). So here we use both 
national pride and confidence in the European Union to proxy the underlying 
European identity. Our identification strategy hinges on taking advantage of 
cross-country variation in preferences and collective identification (social 
identity) over time. A key challenge is to control for potential omitted variables. 
Indeed, cohort effects are important because individuals of the same cohort share 
similar experiences and observable similar constraints. 
 
Given that our results are affected by a number of potential individual 
characteristics, we look at the presence of heterogeneous effects and subsample 
analysis and robustness checks such as examining the role of additional 
instruments (such as years of citizenship education to instrument European 
Union confidence and medals in the Olympic games to instrument national 
pride, as well as peer effects). 
 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Our primary dataset on preference for redistribution and identity is the 
European sample of the World Values Survey, also known as European Values 
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Survey for the period 1981-2014. The dataset provides with a series of repeated 
cross sections observations on the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values 
and opinions of citizens all over Europe. We have employed records of 
individual specific redistributive preferences, alongside rich measures of spatial 
or geographic identity that are recorded in the European Values Survey. 
Specifically, we use self-reported measures of individual’s preference for 
redistribution, which have been validated in previous studies.13 
 
We focus on a set of countries that joined the European Union after 2004. Not all 
countries are covered in each survey wave, but the years range from 1981 to 2014 
(for details see the summary statistics in the Appendix). Overall we are left with 
a fairly large sample of 27,376 respondents. There are several advantages of 
using such a sample. First, it allows one to identify the effect of joining the 
common currency (adopting the euro), in contrast to using the total sample of 
European Union countries; the founding countries of the euro substituted the 
currency almost at the same time and hence there is not enough variability to 
exploit.14 The second advantage of using a sample of those that joined the euro 
after 2004 is that there is likely to be an attraction for joining the euro club 
(“institutional arbitrage” in the spirit of Guiso et al. 2014) which plays out in 
terms of boosting European identity and hence “widening the spatial identity 
beyond the national reach.” Finally the introduction of the common currency 
was an unexpected effect within the time frame of the survey questions (4-6 
years), and so it is unlikely that anticipation effects (on the final success of an 
                                                        13 Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that redistributive preferences correlate in the expected way with political leanings. 14 In addition, exchange rates were pegged from 1999 and hence, the effect of the common currency was already expected and discounted for in such a broader sample. 
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economy in joining a common currency) could threaten the identification of the 
effect on spatial identity. 
 
 
 
As noted, the redistributive preference question is extensively used in the 
literature, and refers to a general question about redistribution without 
specifying the level of authority responsible to make incomes more equal. This 
way, it can be argued to be institutionally neutral. By contrast, national pride 
relates to restricted loyalties to national groups which depend on the perceptions 
of status of national communities. Hence, in this paper we hypothesize that 
becoming fully part of a larger community (for example by joining the euro area) 
would be expected to weaken the effect of national pride. Finally, we use 
confidence in the European Union. This is a different question from trust in the 
working of European institutions: it captures in a multi-question format the 
perceptions of individuals in post-2004 European countries of their degree of 
attachment to the European Union. This question has been found to correlate 
well with other attitudes towards Europe in the sample. 
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Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix show the samples and countries included in 
the dataset alongside the main sample characteristics such as the average age, the 
percentage of women, education attainment, family characteristics and size and 
political affiliation. The sample size of each country is about 1000 respondents. 
Table A.3 displays the sample size of the survey waves which is larger for 1991-
98 than the rest. Tables A.4 to A.6 show the distribution of the main study 
variables and Table A.7 the proportion of countries that have adopted the euro in 
the total sample (13%). 
 
3.2. The Empirical Strategy  
 
Our identification strategy relies on selecting a sample of countries that have 
progressively joined the European Union for which we can identify a period 
before and a period after they adopt the euro as a currency. In doing so, it is 
important to understand how different this subsample of countries is from the 
rest of the European Union member states. Figures A.1 to A.6 (in Section A.3 of 
the Appendix) provide plots of our variable of interest (preferences for 
redistribution) and identity variables for the subgroup of countries that joined 
the EU after 2004 and those that joined before. In each case there appears to be 
little difference between the values in the two subsamples when plotted across 
interview years, but there appears to be evidence of convergence when we plot 
over sample waves. We may conclude that examining the subsample of countries 
is likely to allow us to identify the effect of an identity change in redistributive 
preferences. 
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Perhaps the most obvious problem in examining the effect of identity on 
redistributive preferences is the endogeneity of identity measures, and 
specifically the possibility of reverse causality whereby identity could be viewed 
as the effect of the existence of redistributive institutions. Furthermore, there 
might be unobservable variables that intermediate the association between 
identity and redistributive preferences. In order to account for the non-random 
changes in identity, we use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that exploits 
the exogenous variation of a key institutional change, namely the introduction of 
the euro, which does not directly affect redistributive preferences unless it is by 
changing people’s identification with Europe (the excludability condition). We 
also test for the so-called monotonicity condition to test whether the introduction 
of the euro did indeed affect identity in the expected sign and that the effect is 
strong (relevance condition) which is generally observed by examining the joint 
significance of first-stage estimates in a 2SLS (Staiger’s condition). 
 
Our IV strategy identifies the local average effects of the impact of identity 
changes resulting from the introduction of a common currency. In addition, we 
employ a battery of other instruments to examine whether the sign comparisons 
and results are equally robust. Finally, we undertake some placebo tests to make 
sure our results are not spurious. 
 
We have estimated reduced forms of the effect of identity on redistributive 
preferences. Our identification rests on a combination of cross-sectional, time and 
cohort variation. In some specifications we run cohort-specific regressions to 
examine the potential cohort-specific effects. Country and time-specific trends 
are controlled for, as they could be driving the results. The regression strategy 
includes a quadratic trend to control for all those macroeconomic factors that are 
European Identity and Redistributive Preferences 
        16 
time varying and exhibit a trend in time. Other country-specific time factors are 
expected to be captured by country fixed effects. 
 
The total number of observations is 27,376. Our main dependent variable refers 
to redistributive preferences measured as before. Our treatment variable of 
interest refers to the two variables capturing the effect of identity, namely 
national pride and confidence in the EU. We include a long list of controls 
including demographics, income and socioeconomic, household size and 
employment status and we identify whether individual are immigrants to the 
country. The omitted categories in the regressions are male, elementary or lower 
education, all other marital statuses, no children, all other employment statuses 
and no immigrant status. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Preliminary Evidence  
 
Figures 1 and 2 provide data on the cohort and time trends on preference for 
redistribution in the sample of countries examined in this study. The cohort 
trend indicates that those individuals over 55 are more likely to support 
redistribution. Importantly, redistributive preferences have progressively 
become more salient in people’s attitudes in recent survey waves. This effect is 
not just an artefact of the most recent wave. 
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Figures 3 and 4 examine similar trends in national pride indicating an age 
component to it, which is in line with the hypothesis of Europeanisation as 
reducing national pride: Europeanisation may have reduced national attachment. 
Some research finds time trend identification with Europe in EU countries 
(Fligstein et al. 2012), but identification appears to be largely dependent on the 
economic performance of Europe, particularly unemployment (Guiso et al. 2014). 
Some recent evidence finds that Eastern European countries exhibited a 
comparable or even higher identification with Europe which is in large part 
explained by the large minority groups in many of those European member 
states. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 examine cohort and time trends on EU confidence. Measuring the 
importance of confidence in the EU is important, because being European can 
mean different things across countries whilst confidence with the EU is a 
commonly accepted construct. Interestingly cohort trends show that younger 
cohorts are more likely to identify with Europe, exactly the opposite trend to that 
of national pride. In contrast, we find that time trends suggest a slight reduction 
in EU confidence. This result is consistent with the idea advanced by Fligstein et 
al. (2012), that European identity is a class-based phenomenon directly linked to 
the transnational mobility benefits of the common EU market. However, the rise 
of European identity might be the effect of educational attainment and increasing 
cultural interconnection. To disentangle such effect we need additional 
regression analysis. 
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4.2. Baseline results  
 
Specifications 
 
Our baseline specification is the following: 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛾2𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛾3𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛿𝑟 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑟 refers to the preference-for-redistribution response by an individual 𝑖, 
interviewed at time 𝑡 and in country 𝑟. The variable 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑟 refers to a variable 
indicating individuals’ European identity, measured as the individual 
identification with their country (national pride) or Europe (confidence in the 
European Union). All specifications include a vector of individual characteristics 
𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑟 which includes age, gender, schooling, civil status, size of the area of 
residence;15 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑟 is included to control for changes in income Ã la Meltzer and 
Richard as well as unemployment as potentially driving the results; 𝛿𝑟 refers to 
country fixed effects to control for common background of individuals residing 
in each country, 𝜃𝑡 refers to a wave- (time-) specific effect to control for age-
specific trends in redistributive preferences and 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟 is a random term. 
 
In order to estimate the 2SLS equation we employ a first-stage equation 
capturing the impact of the proposed instrument on the identity questions: 
 
 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1euro𝑡𝑟 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑟 
                                                         15 Although the notation allows for individual 𝑖, interviewed at time 𝑡 and in country 𝑟 some of these characteristics are time-invariant.  
European Identity and Redistributive Preferences 
        22 
where euro refers to a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country 𝑟 has 
adopted the common currency at time 𝑡 and a vector of individual characteristics 
(𝑍𝑖). As a rule-of-thumb the F-test of such a first regression should exceed the 
value 10 for the instrument to be strong enough to meet the relevance condition. 
In addition, the excludability condition refers to the absence of a correlation 
between the error term and the instrument. This condition cannot be tested 
empirically, but we do address some issues concerning this assumption by 
testing the effects of alternative instruments that follow a similar rationale, and 
examining different of suggestive evidence on its plausibility. 
 
All regressions have been estimated using OLS to ease the interpretation of 
coefficients, and robustness checks include specifications using alternative 
techniques dealing with the categorical nature of the data, including a binarised 
identity and redistributive preference variable so as to interpret the dependent 
variable as a probability. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country 
level and descriptive statistics are provided in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the 
Appendix. 
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Baseline regressions 
Table 1 reports the regression results to explain redistributive preferences by 
change in national pride and EU confidence. These are OLS results that do not 
take into account all the potential problems of reverse causality and omitted-
variable bias. We provide different specifications with different controls and 
the beta coefficients to interpret the results as the effects of a one-standard-
deviation change. The effects of income are as expected, indicated by a 
negative and significant coefficient. 
 
A one-standard-deviation increase in national pride is found to reduce 
redistributive preferences by the same magnitude (6%) as a one-standard-
deviation increase in income. As expected, younger individuals are more 
likely to support redistribution. A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
population in tertiary education reduces preferences for redistribution by 
13%. So the effect of education appears to be twice the size of the effect of 
income. This is an important result, given the focus in the literature on the 
Meltzer and Richard type of approach. Indeed, this coefficient is important as 
it can explain why the income ranking of the median voter would not exert 
the predicted influence. Initially, Columns (1) and (6) report only the 
coefficient for national pride and confidence in the EU respectively. The 
regressions contained in columns (2) and (7) report the effect after the 
introduction of a quadratic time trend to account for potential underlying 
trends that could be driving the coefficients. Columns (3) and (8) contain the 
effect of adding additional controls for income and employment, and finally 
Columns (4) and (9) contain the effect resulting from the additional control for 
town size. All regressions contain country fixed effects. Overall, the 
coefficients for national pride exhibit little variation in its size. Importantly, 
Joan Costa-Font and Frank Cowell 
 25    
unemployment which is a variable that is found to explain European 
identification and trust in European institutions (Guiso et al. 2014) does not 
exert an influence on preferences for redistribution. From all the covariates 
reported here the most important determinant of redistributive preferences 
appears to be education.  
 
Table 2 reports a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) analysis that controls for 
reverse causality and unobservables. Now confidence in the EU switches its 
coefficient to being positive and significant and exhibits the same coefficient 
size but with the opposite sign to that of national pride (both are statistically 
significant). Again, the effect’s size indicates that one standard deviation of 
national pride reduces preferences for redistribution by an amount similar in 
size (but opposite in sign) to that of an increase in confidence in the EU. Tests 
all reject the hypothesis of exogeneity, and the F-test of the first stage 
regression both exceed 10 suggesting that instruments are not weak. 
Furthermore, the instrument (join the euro) exhibits the expected sign. As 
expected, looking at the first stage regression we find that women, older 
individuals, married and people without tertiary education, unemployed and 
from smaller towns are more likely to exhibit national pride. 
 
As expected the coefficient for tertiary education remains strongly significant 
and negatively associated with redistributive preferences. Interestingly, 
income and tertiary education have an opposite effect on national pride. 
Again all regressions control for country fixed effects. Some important 
differences across specifications when national pride and confidence in the 
EU are estimated refer to the effect of age, which only the effect of age 
squared turns out to be significant when explaining national pride. In 
contrast, age exhibits a reverse nonlinear effect in explaining confidence in the 
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EU and redistributive preferences. The pattern of coefficients in Table 0 
remains in Table 1 when redistributive preferences are binarised. The 
interpretation is that the probability of supporting redistribution declines by 
2.5% if individuals exhibit national pride, and increases by the same 
magnitude if they have confidence in the EU. Tables 6.4 and 11 in the 
Appendix show that this effect is primarily driven by older-age and low-
income individuals. On this basis we can conclude that the the instrumental 
strategy we employ appears to provide consistent and robust results, given 
that alternative instruments provide similar results. 
 
 
4.3. Robustness checks  
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression estimates using different instruments. In 
Table 4 we use alternative instruments of EU confidence such as a dummy 
indicating whether the country has joined the EU, average confidence in the 
EU (of other countries in the sample) to predict confidence and average pride 
(of other countries in the sample) to predict pride. The exogeneity and F tests 
coefficients all suggest they are not weak instruments and the coefficients are 
all exhibiting the same sign although vary in terms of the impact. An 
expansion of EU confidence exerts a larger positive effect now than the 
negative effects of national pride. Then in Table 3 we examine other 
instruments such as the duration of citizenship education, which turns out to 
be a weak instrument, and the number of medals in the Olympics games 
which was a strong instrument for national pride and results in the IV 
analysis showing a significant and comparable coefficient as in other 
regressions estimates. 
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Table 6 shows that the estimates predicting redistributive preferences are 
robust to the inclusion of political preferences. As before, the inclusion of 
different instruments suggests the same reverse-sign effect in the coefficient 
for EU confidence which now turns positive when including the political 
control in the estimates with the alternative instruments used in Table 3. As 
expected, the more to the right an individual positions himself the less likely 
he is to support redistribution. All estimates exhibit an important nonlinear 
trend which captures among other effects that of time-varying 
macroeconomic and contextual effects. 
 
European Identity and Redistributive Preferences 
   28 
 
 
 
Joan Costa-Font and Frank Cowell 
 29    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Identity and Redistributive Preferences 
   30 
Table 4: Additional instruments I 
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Table 5: Additional instruments II 
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Table 6: Additional covariates 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The rescaling of spatial identity in the context of European integration 
processes is potentially an important effect underpinning changes in 
redistributive preferences. This paper has provided evidence to support that 
claim. However, unlike previous research that mainly stresses the importance 
of group identity, we have argued that the scale of geographical identification 
matters. Specifically, the development of a European identity appears to 
weaken national pride. But how important is this new collective identity in 
shifting preferences for redistribution? The answer to this question could help 
to explain the limited evidence of median-voter explanations for 
redistributive preferences. Indeed, in addition to the information problems 
people face in identifying their position in the income distribution, when 
making redistributive judgments, they appear to react to change in the spatial 
scale of reference. So the expansion of the European integration process 
together with the introduction of a common currency exerts a non-neutral 
influence in the context that influences redistributive preferences. 
 
This paper has specifically examined the effects of spatial identity in those 
countries that joined the EU after 2004 where we can identify the introduction 
of reforms expanding European integration and the effect of joining the single 
currency. Unlike the case of the founding countries of the Eurozone we can 
identify the effect of joining a European club more precisely using the recent-
joiners sample. We find a positive (negative) impact of European identity 
(national identity) on preferences for redistribution. The effect of identity is 
comparable in size to the effect of income and is only exceeded by the effect of 
tertiary education. 
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These results indicate that institutional changes involving symbolic features 
that define one’s identity – in this case the currency – can exert an impact on 
people’s attachments, and more specifically can underpin the formation of a 
person’s identity. We find robust evidence suggesting that the introduction of 
the euro as a common currency in countries that joined the EU after 2004 
increased people’s confidence in the European Union, and reduced the 
importance of national pride. Similarly, this evidence is replicated when other 
potential identity instruments are examined. Using an instrumental variable 
strategy, we find that the exogenous change in European identity resulting 
from a common currency increases people’s preference for redistribution. 
These results are consistent with the previous identity literature.16 
 
Among the policy implications of these findings it appears that there are 
important positive knock-on effects on redistributive preferences associated 
with furthering European integration. The lessening of national pride is more 
likely to lead to changes in individuals’ reference points which influence the 
way they form preferences for redistribution. 
 
                                                        16  See Shayo (2009) and Costa-i-Font and Cowell (2015) for a review. 
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Table 7: OLS results – restricted sample without Latvia and Lithuania
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Table 8: IV results – restricted sample without Latvia and Lithuania
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Appendix A  
A.1 Data 
 
A.1.1 Summary characteristics  
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A.1.2 Background information: Citizenship education  
 
Source: ”Citizenship education in Europe”  
 
Available data (all for 2010/2011):    
 
    • Provision of a separate, compulsory subject focused on elements of 
citizenship education, according to national curricula (ISCED17 1, 2 and 
3), 2010/11.  
 
    • Citizenship education taught as a separate subject or integrated into 
other subjects, by ages, according to national curricula, 2010/11.  
 
                                                        17 International Standard Classification of Education – http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx 
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    • Average minimum taught time devoted to citizenship education as a 
separate subject during a notional year, based on the recommendations 
for primary, general (lower and upper) secondary education, 2010/11.   
Some information on the concept of citizenship education: “The civic 
competences needed to be able to actively exercise citizenship, as defined by 
the European framework for key competences, focus on: a knowledge of basic 
democratic concepts including an understanding of society and social and 
political movements; the European integration process and EU structures; and 
major social developments, both past and present. Civic competences also 
require skills such as critical thinking and communication skills, and the 
ability and willingness to participate constructively in the public domain, 
including in the decision-making process through voting. Finally, a sense of 
belonging to society at various levels, a respect for democratic values and 
diversity as well as support for sustainable development are also highlighted 
as integral components of civic competences. In the context of this report, 
citizenship education refers to the aspects of education at school level 
intended to prepare students to become active citizens, by ensuring that they 
have the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes to contribute to the 
development and well-being of the society in which they live. It is a broad 
concept, which encompasses not only teaching and learning in the classroom 
but also practical experiences gained through school life and activities in 
wider society. It encompasses the narrower concept of â€˜civic education’, as 
defined by the IEA,18 which is restricted to ’knowledge and understanding of 
formal institutions and processes of civic life (such as voting in elections)” 
(IEA 2010a, p. 22). 
                                                         18 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement 
– http://www.iea.nl/  
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2004/05: Age at which pupils are taught citizenship education as a separate 
compulsory subject and duration of this provision in primary and general 
secondary education. 
 
2010/11: Citizenship education taught as a separate subject or integrated into 
other subjects, by ages, according to national curricula. 
 
 
 
A.1.3 Background information: Foreign language proficiency  
 
 
a) Source: “Recommended annual instruction time in full-time compulsory 
education in Europe 2013/14”.  
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Available data:    
 
    • Number of hours and grades attained by school year for foreign 
languages 1 for 9 out of 12 countries.  
 
    • Number of hours and grades attained for by school year for foreign 
languages 2 for 6 out of 12 countries.  
 
 
b) Source: “Key data on teaching languages at school in Europe 2012”  Note: In this publication, there are also trends available in different years; however, the changes are usually none or small. 
 
Available data:    
    • Starting ages for the first and second foreign languages as compulsory 
subjects for all students in pre-primary, primary and/or general 
secondary education, 2010/11.  
    • Starting age and duration of first foreign language as a compulsory 
subject in pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary education, 
reference years 1993/94, 2002/03, 2006/07, 2010/11.  
    • Starting age and duration of second foreign language as a compulsory 
subject in pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary education, 
2002/03, 2006/07, 2010/11.  
    • Provision of foreign languages as core curriculum options in primary 
and/or general secondary level, 2010/11.  
    • Percentage of students learning 0, 1, 2 or more language(s) in general 
upper secondary education (ISCED 3), 2004/05, 2006/07, 2009/10.  
    • Trends in the percentage of students learning English, German and 
French in lower secondary education (ISCED 2), in 2004/05, 2006/07, 
2009/10.  
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    • Trends in the recommended minimum number of hours of compulsory 
foreign language teaching during a notional year in primary and full-
time compulsory general secondary education, 2006/07 and 2010/11. 
 
A 1.4 Background information: Medals in Olympic Games 
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A.2 Summary statistics of sample 
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A.3 Trends in preference and identity variables 
 
Figures A.1 to A.6 depict the trends in key variables across interview years 
and across survey waves for those countries that joined the European Union 
before 2004 and those countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013. 
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A.4 Regressions: further analysis 
 
Tables A.8 to A.10 show the subsample analysis for different age, income and 
gender groups, respectively. 
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Table A.11 shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression 
for alternative main regressors. Columns (1) and (2) show citizencountry (“I 
see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation”, with answers on a scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)); columns (3) and (4) show citizeneu 
(“I see myself as a citizen of the European Union”, with answers on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)); columns (5) and (6) show the 
binary variable eu_notcountry taking a value of 1 if respondent agrees or 
strongly agrees to the statement “I see myself as a citizen of the EU” and 
disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement “I see myself as a citizen of 
the [country] nation”, and 0 otherwise; columns (7) and (8) show the binary 
variable country_noteu taking a value of 1 if respondent agrees or strongly 
agrees to the statement “I see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation” and 
disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement “I see myself as a citizen of 
the EU”, and 0 otherwise; columns (9) and (10) show the binary variable 
country_and_eu taking a value of 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees to 
both the statements “I see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation” and “I 
see myself as a citizen of the EU”, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable 
redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income differences as 
incentives for individual effort) to 10 (incomes should be made more equal); 
independent variables included are age, age squared, female, secondary 
incomplete, secondary, tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town 
size, wave, and wave squared. 
 
Table A.12 investigates cohort effects; cohort_euro is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the euro was introduced during the age 16 to 25 
(impressionable years); proud_cohort is national pride interacted with 
cohort_euro; joineuro_cohort is joineuro interacted with cohort_euro. Column 
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(1) shows an OLS regression, columns (2) and (3) show the 1st and 2nd stage 
of an instrumental variables regression, with joineuro_cohort as an 
instrument for proud_cohort in the 2nd stage (column (3)). The dependent 
variable redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income differences 
as incentives for individual effort) to 10 (incomes should be made more 
equal). Independent variables included are age, age squared, female, 
secondary incomplete, secondary,tertiary, married, children, income, 
unemployed, town size, wave, and wave squared. 
 
Table A.13 shows the interaction of national pride with income; 
proud_income is national pride interacted with the income variable and 
joineuro_income is the interaction of the variables joineuro and income. 
Column (1) shows an OLS regression, columns (2) and (3) show the 1st and 
2nd stage of an instrumental variables regression with national pride 
instrumented with joineuro; columns (4) and (5) show proud_income 
instrumented with joineuro_income. The dependent variable redistribution 
takes values from 1 (we need larger income differences as incentives for 
individual effort) to 10 (incomes should be made more equal). Independent 
variables included are age, age squared, female, secondary incomplete, 
secondary, tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town size, wave, 
and wave squared. 
 
Table A.14 shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression 
for alternative instruments; columns (1) to (4) use duration of the first foreign 
language (in years) in compulsory schooling for each country/year; columns 
(5) to (8) use the first component of a principal components analysis 
consisting of the variables duration of first foreign language, duration of 
citizenship education as a separate subject, and number of medals in Olympic 
summer games. The dependent variable redistribution takes values from 1 
Joan Costa-Font and Frank Cowell 
 53    
(we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort) to 10 
(incomes should be made more equal); independent variables included are 
age, age squared, female, secondary incomplete, secondary, tertiary, married, 
children, income, unemployed, town size, wave, and wave squared. 
 
Table A.15 shows the OLS regressions and Table 18 shows the 1st and 2nd 
stage of an instrumental variables regressions, for the full sample of European 
countries, not only those that joined the European Union after 2003. The 
countries/years included are Bulgaria (1997), Bulgaria (2005), Cyprus (2006), 
Cyprus (2011), Estonia (1996), Estonia (2011), Finland (1996), Finland (2005), 
France (2006), Germany (1997), Germany (2006), Germany (2013), Hungary 
(1998), Hungary (2009), Italy (2005), Latvia (1996), Lithuania (1997), 
Netherlands (2006), Netherlands (2012), Poland (1997), Poland (2005), Poland 
(2012), Romania (1998), Romania (2005), Romania (2012), Slovakia (1998), 
Slovenia (1995), Slovenia (2005), Slovenia (2011), Spain (1995), Spain (2000), 
Spain (2007), Spain (2011), Sweden (1996), Sweden (2006), Sweden (2011) and 
Great Britain (2005). 
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A.5 Convergence criteria 
 
Table A.17: Correlation coefficients between redistribution and convergence criteria 
 
 
Table A.18: Convergence criteria: data and definitions 
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